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Violence is a blanket term that covers several analytically distinct social phenomena. These 
can only be understood when they are treated as elements in events. A re-examination of my 
own study of violence, as well as other ethnographies, shows that violence appears in just ﬁ ve 
basic conﬁ gurations:
1. Violence as a kind of social power (coercive violence)
2. Violence as a cry for help (appealing violence)
3. Violence directed at an imagined body social (such as murder and suicide)
4. Violence as reaction to a physical stimulus (frustration-aggression theory)
5. Violence routinely practiced by states and other organizations.
The article explores the distinctive traits of each type of violent event, as well as certain 
aﬃ  nities between the types.*
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to set out the characteristics of the various types of violent behavior 
and to establish a sociological typology that comprehends the full gamut of violent behaviors. To 
start with I suggest a working deﬁ nition of violence. Then I propose a typology of violent events. 
This is followed by an exposition of the main features of coercive and appealing violence, the 
types of violence I encountered in Ma’alot, a new town in Galilee, Israel which I studied in the 
1960s (Marx 1976). The account is illustrated by brief case studies from my monograph. From 
there I go on to discuss the other types of violence, namely violence directed at an imagined body 
social, violence as reaction to a physical stimulus, and violence routinely practiced by states and 
other organizations. I show that in most respects they diﬀ er radically from coercive and appealing 
violence. I conclude with reﬂ ections on where the ideas broached in the article may lead. 
Types of Violence
Violence is a blanket term that covers several analytically distinct social phenomena. It includes 
such personal behaviors as socially approved coercion, pleading violence, attempted suicide, 
aggression, as well as rape, murder and suicide. It also encompasses violence of the state and other 
organizations, ranging from incarceration, torture, assassination and warfare, to terror and other 
organized forms of violent crime. These types of violence can only be distinguished when they 
are viewed as elements in events. A re-examination of my own study of violence, as well as some 
recent work of anthropologists, psychologists and political scientists, shows that violence appears 
in just ﬁ ve basic conﬁ gurations or “concrete types”:
1. Violence as a kind of social power. The category includes individual acts of coercive 
violence, as well as acts of organized terror.
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2. Violence as a cry for help. It encompasses acts of appealing violence, including attempted 
suicides.
3. Violence directed at an imagined body social. The category comprises homicides and 
genuine suicides, as well as human sacriﬁ ces.
4. Violence as reaction to a physical stimulus. This category refers to instinctive aggressive 
acts caused by frustration. It used to be the psychologists’ favored theory of violence. It 
explains a small number of violent events.
5. Violence routinely exercised by states and other organizations while discharging their 
duties and functions, or while advancing their interests. It ranges from the administration 
of public order, such as policing, riot control, imprisonment and execution of criminals, 
operation of economic enterprises, through the pursuit of war, military occupation 
and colonialist exploitation of human and natural resources, to ethnic cleansing and 
genocide. Max Weber (1964: 39) called it, not ironically, “legitimate violence”.
Violence Deﬁ ned
In my study of violent behavior in Ma’alot,1 an immigrant town in Upper Galilee, Israel, I deﬁ ned 
violence as “physical assault, or threat of physical assault, on persons or property” (Marx 1976: 7). 
To this concise working deﬁ nition I would now add a clause that the victim must strongly resent this 
violence, even if he or she does not expressly say so. Other important restrictions are indicated: we 
must not consider verbal abuse and insults which do not constitute a real threat, such as the popular 
“symbolic violence” discussed in Bourdieu and Passeron’s Reproduction in Education, Society 
and Culture (1977, especially book 1), or playful physical assaults, such as “joking relationships” 
(Radcliﬀ e-Brown 1952a, b) as violent, as their inclusion would trivialize the potential danger and 
destructiveness of violence. I stress this point, although I am aware that in reality a verbal insult 
may easily turn into a violent threat.  
Nor does the deﬁ nition require a violent act to be “illegal”, as suggested by more than one 
scholar (e.g. Riches 1986: 3; Halbmayer 2001: 50). The issue of legality is almost irrelevant, ﬁ rst, 
because agents of the state engage in many varieties of legally permitted acts of violence. States 
customarily legalize their most heinous and unjust violent crimes. As such deeds are prohibited 
to ordinary citizens, the agents and allies of the state describe them in understated neutral terms 
that disguise their violent nature. The state wages wars, ﬁ ghts terrorists, controls riots, arrests 
persons for various oﬀ enses, interrogates them, sentences them to imprisonment and death and 
executes them, and pretends that these often extremely violent acts are the just and legal way to 
deal with some of the most complicated social issues. Legality must in these cases be viewed as 
part of a whitewashing operation. Second, because most people consider activities that border on 
the illegal as relatively harmless and permissible. Even the state rarely prosecutes persons who 
engage in such activities as consensual violence between individuals, including violence between 
1 In most of my publications I call the town “Galilah”. The disguise is no longer necessary, both because 
of the passage of time and, more importantly, because it was not required in the ﬁ rst place. The people of 
Ma’alot were by ordinary standards law-abiding citizens who shunned violence. Only their almost total 
dependence on a handful of oﬃ  cials who controlled essential resources, such as housing and welfare 
payments, caused them occasionally to threaten these oﬃ  cials with violence. In a more egalitarian 
environment, the verbal threats would not have been treated as “violent”.
      Although many townspeople know of the study, and some have read and commented on it, I respect 
their anonymity, in order not to cause any embarrassment.
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sexual partners, ﬁ ghting among children, and people who engage in martial arts and competitive 
sports. Third, because even in clearly illegal violent acts, such as wife- and child-beating, drunken 
brawls, teachers physically disciplining unruly children, and youths vandalizing public property, 
the state often shows a surprising degree of leniency, as long as they are not directed against its 
agents. By tolerating such acts, the state provides them with a cloak of legality.
The typology consists of “concrete types”, as it starts from observed events of violence and tries 
to make sense of them by subjecting them to a long drawn out “abductive reasoning”. The term 
“abductive reasoning”, coined by the American sage Charles S. Peirce, refers to a long chain 
of thinking about observations, in which bits of reality are continuously confronted with their 
interpretations. Repeated eﬀ orts to obtain a better understanding of reality, may eventually lead 
toward an integrated presentation of an ever expanding array of facts together with an increasingly 
complex theoretical interpretation (see Hazan and Hertzog, in press). Once the characteristics of a 
concrete type are established, an observed violent event may easily be classiﬁ ed. Concrete types 
do not resemble Weber’s ideal types, for these are logically consistent mental constructs which are 
then applied to a reality that never lives up to the required standards. Weber treats precisely the 
concrete behaviors which are so central to my conception as “irrational” accretions to the logical 
concept (Weber 1964: 7).
Why do I insist on concrete types? Because violent acts (even those seemingly caused by frustration) 
can only be explained on the basis of detailed ethnographic data. For “the machinery of the mind can 
only transform knowledge, but never originate it, unless it be fed with facts of observation” (Peirce 
1878: 286). Kurt Lewin oﬀ ers a precise prescription of how this is done. To understand reality, he 
argues, we need “to describe the totality of those facts and only those facts which make up the ﬁ eld 
[studied]” (Lewin 1952: 62). Only when the full facts making up a violent event are ascertained, it can 
be understood. When numerous violent events are compared, it becomes evident that they belong to 
distinct types. Some of these have a family resemblance, while others are totally unconnected.
An analogy may best explain what I mean. The word “fever” resembles “violence” in that it refers 
to many types of events, in this case – illnesses. Yet no one would claim that the fact that a patient 
runs a high temperature is enough to diagnose his illness. This is so because medicine is a highly 
developed discipline that seeks to understand the causes, symptoms and remedies of many distinct 
varieties of illness. In a complex diagnosis, fever is a symptom that plays a subordinate role. In the 
same way, violence should be viewed as component of a variety of social events. Yet in the social 
sciences violence is still often treated as an analytical category. Politicians, social workers, and the 
man on the street, as well as some scholars, routinely speak about violence in schools, violence on 
the road, violence in the media, or violent crime, as if they were all chips of the same block. While 
social scientists have developed some rudimentary analytical categories, such as the distinction 
between expressive and functional violence, violence as a cry for help versus violence as a way to 
opt out of society, or “aggression” as an instinctive response to a frustrating experience as against 
calculated and controlled violence, many of them continue to use violence as a meaningful concept 
and still think they can pronounce general truths about “violence”, treat it as a social malaise, and 
even oﬀ er remedies against it.
It is precisely because there are several distinct types of violence, that I ﬁ nd the notion of a “continuum 
of violence” proposed by Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004: 1–2) less than helpful. The concept 
lumps together all types of violence, thus preventing the authors from fully understanding any 
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of them. The concept is supported by unanalyzed reports of local violent incidents, which tend 
to move abruptly from interesting stories to highly abstract moralizing statements about society. 
Thus, in a recent debate on violence in America (Scheper-Hughes and Robben 2008: 77–82), 
Scheper-Hughes draws thumbnail sketches of three “senseless killings” that occurred in Berkeley, 
and uses them to illustrate major causes of violence in today’s America. Her approach invites 
some important questions. Does she think that “senseless” shootings are arbitrary and cannot be 
explained in sociological terms? Does she really believe that murders are the most salient or most 
typical form of violence and thus representative of the whole gamut of violence? And lastly, does 
she think that all violence is morally reprehensible? She would surely reply in the negative to all 
three questions. 
Structural violence is the most generalized and inclusive category on the continuum of violence. 
It refers to the widespread suﬀ ering caused by the social order itself, as explained by Kleinman 
(2000: 226): “Suﬀ ering … is the eﬀ ect of the social violence that social orders – local, national, 
global – bring to bear on people.” The equation of violence with suﬀ ering allows the anthropologist 
to deﬁ ne any aspect of the social order that she considers morally reprehensible as a manifestation 
of structural violence. This attitude is conducive to writings in which righteous indignation reigns 
supreme, and social analysis takes a backseat. I must however concede that some of these socially 
aware scholars, particularly Bourgois (2003), Das (2000), Farmer (2004), Green (1999), Kleinman 
(2000) and Scheper-Hughes (1992), have produced original and insightful ethnographies which 
contribute to the understanding of certain varieties of violence.
Arendt goes to the other extreme and identiﬁ es violence as a form of power that is used instrumentally 
(1979: 46). It is thus similar to my “coercive violence”. I am in sympathy with her analysis, as far 
as it goes. But Arendt seems unaware that she has interpreted just one type of violence, however 
correctly, and tends to extend the analysis to other types. 
Although I am deeply interested in the problem of power, I could not place the types of violence 
on a continuum of power-powerlessness. Violence is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that cannot 
be ﬁ tted on a continuum. In addition, power is more important in some types of violence than in 
others. In acts of aggression, as well as homicides and suicides, power does not usually play an 
important role, while it is central in acts involving coercive and appealing violence. One should 
also note that the state and other organizations employ violence so liberally that most theories of 
power do not work for them.
The types of violence can, of course, be placed on a topological plane, provided we possess a full 
knowledge of their qualities. I can make a small contribution toward this aim, by describing the 
characteristics of the various types of violence. I begin with coercive violence, the type I am most 
familiar with. 
Coercive Violence
Coercive violence is used as a kind of power to attain a socially approved aim. It is arguably 
the most common type of violence, and because most instances occur in ordinary daily life it 
is relatively easy to observe and thus amenable to sociological analysis. It encompasses a whole 
range of violent acts, from attempts of a person to coerce another into complying with his wishes 
by threatening or assaulting him, through organized strikes or other types of civil disobedience, to 
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terrorist acts including those that require the terrorist to sacriﬁ ce his own life. Acts of terror are, of 
course, relatively rare and harder to observe and interpret. Yet judging from what we know about 
them, they appear to possess many of the characteristics of coercive violence. 
I claim that these violent acts are very complex forms of behavior, and that they are all structured 
in a similar manner. First, in each of them the violent act is premeditated, and carried out in a 
calculated and controlled manner for a deﬁ ned and socially approved purpose. Here are some 
examples from my study of violence in Ma’alot. For instance, a patient threatened to beat up 
the physician at the local health clinic if he did not provide him with a sick leave certiﬁ cate. He 
knew that the physician would submit meekly, as he had done many times before, and that there 
would be no further consequences (Marx 1976: 48).  However, the violent person does not usually 
dominate the ﬁ eld to that extent. Instead, he interacts with other persons who do not necessarily 
share his concerns or approve of his actions. Furthermore, in the heat of the argument, he or she 
may lose self-control and become more violent than intended. This happened to a recently married 
woman who wished to move into a larger apartment. She tried to coerce the oﬃ  cial of the Housing 
Corporation by sitting a whole morning in his oﬃ  ce and intermittently uttering threats. When the 
oﬃ  cial wished to close the oﬃ  ce for a lunch break she refused to budge. The moment the oﬃ  cial 
walked out of the oﬃ  ce she overturned his desk. When he hurried back she said: “I am not a dog to 
be left alone like that”. He called the police and lodged a complaint for trespass. She was not only 
taken to court, but also forfeited the chance to obtain a new apartment (Marx 1976: 36). 
Second, the violent act requires an audience, large or small, that functions as referee; it decides 
whether the demands of the perpetrator are justiﬁ ed and whether his violent behavior is appropriate 
to the occasion. As the assailant can never be certain of public approval, there is always an element 
of risk in the violent act. This happened to a notorious drunkard in the local café. After having had 
several drinks, he asked the bartender for just another drink. When the bartender refused, he took 
this as an insult. With one swing of his arm he swiped oﬀ  all the glasses on the counter. The other 
customers just looked on. Then the drunken man decided that he had not caused enough damage, 
and went on to break the glass shelves. At this point the audience disapproved of his behavior; 
several customers restrained him and delivered him up to the police (Marx 1976: 65–6).
Third, violence is always used in conjunction with other forms of power. I use the concept “power” 
as deﬁ ned by Max Weber: “Power (Macht) means the chance that in a social relationship a [person’s] 
will prevails even against [the other person’s] resistance, no matter what this chance is based on 
… Every conceivable characteristic, and every conceivable constellation may enable him get his 
way in a given situation” (Weber 1964: 38, my translation2). In Weber’s conception power can 
take many forms, including unexpected ones. Even a physical ﬂ aw, a weakness, may in certain 
conditions become a winning asset. Nevertheless, a person who does not possess alternative sources 
of power will not engage in violence, because it may be too risky for him. To ensure success he 
employs a battery of various forms of power. Thus, in Ma’alot only persons with secure jobs or 
good links with the ruling Labor Party could threaten and coerce the housing corporation oﬃ  cial 
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2 I translated the passage from the original German (Weber 1964), because the Parsons and Henderson 
translation (Weber 1947) is quite misleading. In their inimitable opaque style, they translate the deﬁ nition 
thus: “’Power’ (Macht) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber 
1947: 139).
with impunity. I know of no instance of a powerless person attempting to coerce an oﬃ  cial, or of 
desperate persons using violence as a last resort.
Fourth, the violent act must simultaneously achieve two aims: it should draw the attention of the 
intended victim and of the audience to the perpetrator’s prepared message; and it should also 
deliver that message in a pithy, easily understood manner. Logically, the arousal of attention should 
come ﬁ rst, to prepare the victim and the rest of the audience for the upcoming message. In reality, 
the violent act usually contains both elements. The violent act then is the message. In the cases 
observed in Ma’alot, the violent act and the message were bundled together and the audience 
instantaneously listened to and understood the message. I was witness to several threatened 
assaults by townspeople on oﬃ  cials controlling public resources that were in great demand, such 
as new apartments. People would threaten to smash chairs on the head of the local representative 
of Amidar, the national housing corporation. The message of the raised chair was that while the 
corporation was all powerful, it could not protect the local oﬃ  cial’s body against physical assault. 
While he was a powerful oﬃ  cial, he was still a vulnerable person and had therefore better accede 
to the assailant’s demands. The act was understood by all the parties concerned, and often yielded 
results. Some of the assailants got their new apartment, while others were turned down, and a few 
were arrested and charged with trespass (Marx 1976: 59–60).
Terrorist acts deliver a more powerful and no less persuasive message. For instance, on two separate 
occasions in July 2008 two Palestinians from the suburbs of Jerusalem drove bulldozers into cars 
and buses on Jerusalem’s main street, killing and wounding dozens of persons. Their message 
was clear: they protested against the Jerusalem Municipality’s policy of destroying houses that 
were built “illegally”, i.e. without applying for the unattainable (for Palestinians) building permits. 
It may come as a surprise to many, that even in the most revolting and bloody acts of terror, the 
terrorists’ aim is not so much to kill people and destroy property, as to convey an important message 
to a speciﬁ c audience. This is true even for the most extreme instances of murderous violence, 
such as 9/11, where the horrible spectacle of dead and maimed men and women amid destroyed 
buildings, was designed to arouse the public’s attention to the message of the perpetrators: “We 
faithful Muslims will not allow American capitalists and imperialists to run the world, and we 
shall win because we are prepared to give our lives for the cause”. The message of 9/11 was heard 
and understood around the world (see Baudrillard 2002: 90; Dostal 2008: 186; Hamid 2007: 73). 
While the American government pretended that there was a crime but no message (Shamir 2002: 
315) and only a few social scientists took the trouble to listen, the American Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld knew better. He complained that “The cost-beneﬁ t ratio is against us! Our cost is billions 
against the terrorists’ cost of millions” (Atran 2005: 126), echoing a similar pronouncement by the 
Qa’ida leader Osama bin Laden. The message had been understood, after all. 
Only an unheard of crime could create a moment of attention for the message. The inhabitants of 
today’s urbanized world are continuously confronted with such great amounts of visual and acoustic 
information that they simply cannot absorb them. As Simmel (1964: 413–15) and others have shown, 
city-dwellers (the representatives of modern living) become insensitive to impersonal messages 
and learn to ignore them. They are so blasé and apathetic that often only the most outrageous and 
explosive assaults on their senses will attract their attention to a particular message.
Fifth, the violent act engages the participating parties in negotiations that may continue well after 
the violent incident. Their outcome is often determined by the strategic use of other forms of 
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power. During the violent act, as well as during the negotiations that follow, the victim and the 
perpetrator contest the message. For instance, the Israeli authorities systematically prevent the 
messages of Palestinian terrorists/freedom ﬁ ghters from reaching the wider public. After each act 
of terror they encourage the media to concentrate for endless hours on the innocent victims and 
their fate. That leaves them little time to analyze the causes of the violent act. Yet the security forces 
examine the messages carefully, usually in order to respond in kind, by more violence. In Ma’alot’s 
housing oﬃ  ce too the negotiations continued even after the oﬃ  cial turned down the applicant’s 
request for a new apartment, and especially in those instances in which he had called in the Police. 
Now the negotiations dealt with the nature of the complaint, and the charges against the most 
obstinate and unrepentant assailants were eventually dropped. Those assailants who admitted that 
they had been at fault and asked the oﬃ  cial’s forgiveness were sentenced to ﬁ nes and suspended 
prison terms, because of “ameliorating circumstances”. They became warning examples to other 
potential assailants.
Finally, the violent act re-structures or re-deﬁ nes reality for the participants. If they were caught 
in an impasse, the sudden jolt induces them to seek a way out. That is what parents expect when 
they slap an obstreperous child. And that is what the suicide bomber expects at the instant he blows 
himself up. The new situation may not be much diﬀ erent from the earlier one, the violent act may 
not be eﬃ  cacious in the long run, but for the moment the participants’ perception of their world 
has changed. Here is another example from Ma’alot. A respected foreman of relief workers had 
fractured a leg and could not go out to work. His wife was running up debts at the grocer’s. One 
day the grocer refused to sell her more food. She returned home and angrily accused her husband 
of not providing for his family. In response he hit her, but she returned the blows. Finally he threw 
his crutch at her, the symbol of his incapacity, and she sustained a serious wound on her head. As I 
was driving her to hospital she said that she “knew what he meant”, namely that he was an invalid 
and just could not work. But following on their violent dialogue he too re-evaluated the situation. 
The following morning he hobbled on his crutches to the social welfare oﬃ  ce, and asked for a 
grant to tide his family over the diﬃ  cult times. Once he overcame his pride the issue could be 
resolved (Marx 1976: 81–87).
Violence as a Cry for Help
Violence as a cry for help, or appealing violence, has an aﬃ  nity with coercive violence. Here too the 
perpetrator seeks to achieve a socially approved purpose, but does not have the power to coerce others 
to his will. He therefore relies on others to help him. His violence may be deﬂ ected onto an innocent 
person, such as a wife or child, who is suﬃ  ciently dependent on him to suﬀ er violence without 
responding harshly. Or he may direct the violence against himself, in order to enlist others to his aid. 
The perpetrator will always enact this type of violence in the presence of those to whom he intends 
to appeal. Of course, where the assailant himself does not know how to solve his problem, there is 
always a chance that the persons he appeals to will not know how to help him. The outcome is usually 
a temporary solution to the assailant’s problem, such as the patching up of a tense relationship, or all 
round expressions of good intentions, but no re-structuring of relationships.
Here is a short case from Ma’alot: A mother accompanied her little girl on the ﬁ rst day of school. 
She had left several unattended children at home, and was in a hurry to leave. But the girl was 
afraid of the new people and unaccustomed surroundings and refused to join her classmates. She 
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clung to her mother, and the harder the mother pressed her to join the other children the more 
frightened she grew, till she broke out in tears. The mother furiously slapped her on the face and 
body. Only then did the teacher take notice of the mother’s violent appeal: she spoke soothingly 
to the girl, and introduced her to her classmates. A solution had been found, and the mother could 
return home (Marx 1976: 63–65).
Attempted suicides may appear more dramatic and complex, but can nevertheless be understood in 
the same terms, as the following case will show: An elderly Ma’alot man, who had been a prosperous 
businessman in his native Morocco, was employed on low-paid relief work. He could no longer 
provide for his wife and ten children. One day his eldest daughter came home with good news: she 
had just been admitted to a teacher’s college, and all expenses would be covered by a state grant. 
An hour later the man slashed his belly with a razor-blade, while his wife and children looked on 
helplessly. I heard the screaming, rushed to the family’s apartment, saw the bloodbath and fetched 
a doctor. While he was being bandaged, he murmured “I did it only for my children”, probably 
meaning that he did it because of his children who no longer needed him. His daughter’s success had 
made it clear that the children were getting on without him, and the violent act was a plea to them to 
rally round him. They certainly wished to help him, but could not alter the basic situation: he was 
ageing and in no position to support his family. Several years later the man made another suicide 
attempt, again to no avail (Marx 1976: 87–91). He continued his futile negotiations with the members 
of his family for some show of respect, but all the children became absorbed in careers that took 
them away from their parents and out of Ma’alot. Eventually he receded into a chronic illness.
Violence Directed at an Imagined Body Social
People who kill others or commit suicide in order to solve their own problems act within the 
framework of their culture. But their aims are neither approved by their fellow-men, nor implemented 
in a socially congenial fashion. Murderers and suicides usually act without consulting others 
beforehand and do not care what an audience might think about their behavior. All they wish to 
achieve is to remove a serious obstacle, to get rid of an intractable problem, and literally get away 
with murder. The homicide and the suicide act surreptitiously and, if they can help it, leave no 
traces. Thus, a “genuine” suicide does not write an explanatory note, does not even throw out hints 
as to his intentions. He tends to kill himself in an uninhabited place, as he does not even wish his 
body to be recovered. These statements must be tempered, because many seemingly determined 
suicides wish in some way to stay alive and be remembered. These are probably the 15 per cent 
who do leave suicide notes (Stengel 1964: 36–7), and some of them may be persons aﬄ  icted by a 
terminal illness who out of consideration for their relatives commit what Durkheim (1970: 217) 
calls “altruistic suicide”. In real life, however, the motivation may be more complex, and combine 
deference to some social norms with a total disregard for others. Thus both female infanticides and 
adult suicides among the Netsilik Eskimos are motivated by a mix of altruistic consideration for 
the living and the egotistic desire of the survivors to destroy persons who may deplete their scant 
food supply (Balikci 1970: 147–72). An Arab who murders his sister in order to uphold norms of 
female sexual comportment, or avenges his brother’s murder, may believe that by destroying the 
blot on his honor he will regain the respect of his fellows. Yet the fact that he had not, in the ﬁ rst 
place, prevented the slight on his family or descent group is irreparable (Ginat 1987; Kressel 1982). 
Such weakness is inexcusable and the even weaker woman pays the price.
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While the murderer and suicide then may act against the public interest and without regard for the 
public’s demands and expectations, they still think and behave as social beings. In one respect, in 
particular, are murderers and suicides fully social, and behave very similarly to persons engaging 
in coercive violence: they act in a premeditated and calculated manner in order to achieve a socially 
learned, if not approved, aim, such as monetary gain, revenge of an insult, ending a dispute. In spite 
of appearances, they are not necessarily motivated by deep anger or driven by a sudden outburst 
of rage. The best examples of cold-blooded deliberate murders are provided by the confessions of 
poisoners (Watson 2006). They negotiate with the public only when they are discovered. Then they 
declare that they were possessed by uncontrollable rage or momentary mental incapacity, in order 
to save their skin.
The ambiguity of murder reaches an extreme when it is carried out on behalf of an organization. 
The general who sends soldiers into battle, or the maﬁ a boss who directs gangsters to eliminate 
traitors and adversaries, never knows whether the emissary will become an executioner or a victim. 
Both eventualities are therefore addressed simultaneously, and the killer becomes a “hero”. For the 
meaning of the term comprises two alternatives: the victorious living hero and the glorious dead 
hero. When looked at from a sociological perspective, in both instances the emissaries remove 
obstacles in the path of their organizations; the successful ones eliminate an enemy and the 
unsuccessful ones – become victims whose “sacriﬁ ce serves to protect the entire community from 
its own violence” (Girard 1979: 8).
Violence as Reaction to a Physical Stimulus
This type of violence is often called aggression. For the last seventy years Frustration-Aggression 
Theory has been the paradigm for much psychological and, to a lesser extent, sociological research 
on violence. The theory was ﬁ rst stated systematically in Dollard et al. 1939, Frustration and 
Aggression. It was a by-product of McDougall’s instinct theory, mediated through Freudian 
psychoanalysis. The proponents of the theory claimed that a physical or mental impediment, which 
they called “frustration”, will almost automatically result in a violent reaction, called “aggression”. 
Over the years the theory has been reﬁ ned and brought closer to social reality and achieved many 
important insights. The notion of instinct, in particular, has been dropped by most psychologists. 
While some leading ethologists still use frustration-aggression theory, they concede that there is 
a variety of forms of aggression in animals. Ashley Montagu (1976: 14–15) lists no less than 13 
forms of aggression in animals, elicited by diﬀ erent neural and endocrinal bases. He warns us that 
“to speak of ‘aggressive behavior’ as if it were a single phenomenon is to be guilty of misleading 
oversimpliﬁ cation” (1976: 15).
I do not claim that frustration-aggression theory is mistaken. I only argue that in its basic form 
it accounts for a relatively small number of violent events, precisely those in which a physical 
stimulus triggers a violent response. For instance, when someone steps on my toes, and I push him 
to relieve the pain, I engage in this type of violence. As this is supposedly instinctive behavior, 
none of the social dimensions found in the other types of violence should apply here. In real life, 
of course, even the instinctive reaction may be inhibited, for example if the person who steps on 
my toes is my social superior. Thus the impact of the social surroundings will further reduce the 
actual incidence of aggression. These practical limitations have hardly aﬀ ected the popularity of 
the theory.
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Frustration-Aggression Theory is sometimes made to explain organized terror. Thus Atran (2005: 
134) argues that “revolutionary terror imprints itself into history when corrupt and corroded 
societies choke rising aspirations into explosive frustration”, implying that not only individuals but 
communities too can experience frustration and react violently to it. It is, of course, quite possible 
for a person to translate his mental frustration into communal violence, such as a public lynching 
(Litwack 2004: 123–24). But this is brought about neither by personal nor communal, and neither 
physiological nor mental frustration, but by the profound commitment of leaders and sympathizers 
to an ideology and the will to implement it. Terrorists with a social message are typically elated and 
self-assured, at least while the going is good, and not dejected or frustrated. 
While the psychologists have gradually abandoned the old paradigm, it is to their credit that 
they have not come up with another grand theory of violence. They recognized, long before 
the anthropologists, that there are diﬀ erent kinds of violence, and developed valuable theories 
of instrumental coercive actions (Tedeschi and Felson 1994), attempted suicide and suicide 
(Shneidman 1998), wife-beating (Gelles 1997), child-beating (Helfer, Kempe and Krugman 1999), 
and obedience to inhumane orders (Milgram 2004). 
Violence Exercised by States and Organizations 
The ﬁ fth category is the violence routinely employed by states and other organizations, such 
as armies and police forces and other total institutions, like prisons, mental asylums, and 
concentration camps. Crime syndicates, oil and rubber companies, and producers of legal and 
illegal drugs show similar patterns of organized violence. This category covers countless instances 
of violence, including some of the harshest forms. All these violent acts have several characteristics 
in common: First, they are not unanimously construed as violence. The perpetrators, at least, treat 
their activities, violent as they may appear to an observer, as normal routine acts that are “all in 
a day’s work.” Second, these acts are usually legal, or are legalized after the event. Third, they 
are carried out in an organized and calculated manner and not in anger. Fourth, the perpetrators 
are controlled and indoctrinated by the organization to a degree that goes far beyond the work 
situation. Fifth, the message addressed to the victim and the public, so central in cases of personal 
violence, is often neglected in state violence. It appears that the state and organizations consider 
neither the victim of state violence nor the bystanders important enough to merit a message. And 
lastly, states and other organizations use violence in preference to other forms of power, even when 
their use is indicated and they are easily available. In this they diﬀ er from most other wielders of 
violence, who employ violence as part of a mix of powers.
A frequent characteristic of such violence is its legalization. It is not necessarily enshrined in 
formal law, because the organizers do not wish ever to be held responsible. Therefore it is often 
handed down in the internal rules and regulations of a bureaucratic organization. A good example 
is the German Kristallnacht of November 1938. To launch a nationwide “spontaneous” pogrom, 
the Nazi cabinet planned its moves weeks ahead, coordinated the operations of local leaders and 
their troopers, and mounted a massive propaganda campaign (Gilbert 2007, chapter 1). Yet they 
construed the event as a popular protest.
While the Nazis continued to take precautions against the revelation of their crimes, as these deeds 
became routinized and naturalized they became less concerned about public reaction. Thus the 
German chief of staﬀ  Keitel signed an order on June 6, 1941, just before the German invasion of the 
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former Soviet Union, which instructs soldiers to shoot various enemies, especially all grades of political 
commissars. In army usage it was euphemistically dubbed the “Kommissarsbefehl” [Commissars’ 
Order]. The order explicitly abolishes the international rules of war and sets up guidelines on how to 
deal with the enemy in a “war of elimination”: “To show consideration for [enemy] elements during 
this struggle or to act in accordance with international rules of war is wrong … Political commissars 
… have to be dealt with immediately and with maximum severity. As a matter of principle they will 
be shot at once whether captured during operations or otherwise showing resistance” (Browning 
2004: 220–21; see also Friedländer 2008: 134–35). This order “legally” permitted the indiscriminate 
shooting of Russian soldiers and civilians, and promised the culprits immunity from prosecution. 
Under the terms of the order regular German policemen and soldiers – not SS troopers – shot 
millions of Poles, Russians and Jews with impunity and out of a sense of duty (see the harrowing 
documentation of the Jósefów massacre in Browning 1998: 55–70). 
To the extent that an audience is involved, it is made up largely of fellow perpetrators of violence. 
They tend to jointly establish a consensus, a fellowship in crime, which condones or even justiﬁ es 
the violent acts (see Edgerton 1990: 52–64). The organizations are so concerned about maintaining 
the morale (but not the morals) of their members, that they supervise their thoughts, monitor their 
written communications, and indoctrinate them day in day out, as part of their eﬀ orts to turn them 
into cogs of total institutions. In the teaching of business schools these activities are subsumed 
under the rubric “corporate culture” (see Kunda 1992).
Another characteristic of such violence is that the perpetrators envelop it in a cloak of secrecy 
that includes eﬀ orts to disguise the activity, close oﬀ  the locations at which it is performed, and 
reduce public access to information. Those who know too much, whether they are in or outside the 
organization, are either quickly eliminated or kept on indeﬁ nitely in the same oﬃ  cial function and 
provided with incentives to stay on.
The message, that is such a central aspect of coercive violence, is almost entirely missing. Agents 
of the state are not concerned with sending messages to the audience of their violence, beyond a 
general desire to instill fear. In most instances, they do not tell the victim why they assaulted him, 
and certainly do not engage him in dialogue. All they want to achieve is full subjection. Thus in 
the notorious assault of the Los Angeles police on Rodney King, which was recorded on ﬁ lm, the 
oﬃ  cers never told the victim why he was being arrested. They were concerned solely with getting 
him prostrated on the ground, in a posture that signiﬁ es abject submission. One oﬃ  cer testiﬁ ed: 
“I was trying to knock him down from the push up position, back down on the ground, where he 
would be in a safer position” (Feldman 1994: 409). While this was a kind of message, it did not 
explain the violence.
A most interesting aspect is that states and organizations prefer violence to other forms of power. 
Ordinary persons employ violence as part of a mix of various forms of power, and resort to it 
neither as the ﬁ rst and only means nor as the ultimate desperate means of achieving their aim. That 
states regularly and routinely employ violence was recognized by Max Weber. In a memorable 
passage he says (Weber 1964: 39):
For political organizations violence (Gewaltsamkeit) is neither the only, nor even the normal 
means of administration. Their leaders have rather employed every conceivable means to 
achieve their aims. But the threat and, eventually, the application [of violence] is their speciﬁ c 
means, and is always the ultima ratio [last resort], when other means fail.
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Sociologically, every organization is, by sheer dint of collecting and applying the power of many 
individuals, a political organization that readily uses violence. Therefore I agree with Weber’s 
dictum that because the state enforces “a monopoly of legitimate physical coercion (Zwang)” 
(Weber 1964: 39) violence is always close at hand.  I must however distance myself from the 
argument that violence is the last resort of states and organizations when other means have failed. 
Experience has shown that it is quite often the ﬁ rst means, and occasionally the only one, they use 
to resolve a problematic issue. A good example are Palestine activists who during the ﬁ rst uprising 
(intifada) of 1987–1992 killed hundreds of fellow-activists whom they accused of collaborating 
with the enemy, at a time when there was no way to avoid contact with the Israeli occupiers (Jean-
Klein 2007: 175). This is true not only for the designated purveyors of organized violence, such as 
the police, army, security agencies, and prisons, and their organized counterparts in the informal 
sector, but also for other agencies of the state, such as social welfare oﬃ  ces and courts of law. Thus 
the courts in Israel, both family courts and courts of appeal, disregard the expressed wishes of 
children to a point that borders on violence. In cases where one parent “abducted” the child against 
the wishes of the other, the children are forcibly handed over to the parent preferred by the judge, 
although the judge knows less than the child about the situation on the ground (see Shuz 2008: 
294–300). Commercial and industrial organizations do not fall much behind in the gratuitous use 
of violence, even where the use of other forms of power is indicated (see Taussig 1991: 37–50). 
What Next?
In the article I have tried to describe diﬀ erent types of violent events. An obvious next step 
is to show the variations within each type and break down the rigid boundaries between the 
types, and to show that in real life a violent act may go through various stages and change its 
character in the process. There would be nothing new in this, for the procedure has been applied 
successfully to other hidebound concepts, such as kinship and community. I hope and expect 
that further study will require a revision of the typology.
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